Investigating the Effect of Political Regime and Natural Resources on the Quality of Economic Governance

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD Student of Economics at Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor of Economics at Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran

3 Assistant Professor of Economics at Institute for Management and Planning Studies, Tehran, Iran

10.22059/jppolicy.2022.89540

Abstract

Is the type of political regime effective in shaping the resources curse and weakening the performance of economic governance? By formulating an analytical framework and presenting empirical results, it is shown that the presence of natural resources in democratic regimes has not had a negative effect. Rather, the quality of democracy has been a determining factor in the formation of economic governance. In contrast, the presence of natural resources in centralized dictatorships has had a negative effect on the quality of economic governance. But such an effect is not seen in decentralized dictatorships where political power is divided among members of the ruling group. The results show that in addition to the type of political regime, the type of natural resource is also effective in the formation of the resources curse. Sensitivity analysis indicates the stability of the results to the dependent variable change, the addition of control variables, and the sample change.
JEL‌‌: P16, P26, O10

Keywords


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