Policy Instrument Analysis: Evaluating the Impact of Iran’s Electronic Attorney Contract Registration System on Reducing Tax Evasion

Document Type : Research Article

Authors

1 Master's Degree of Management of Technology, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

2 Associate Professor of Management of Technology, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Tax evasion poses a significant challenge to Iran’s government despite its pressing need for tax revenues. This study investigates the effect of the Judiciary’s electronic attorney contract registration system on reducing tax evasion. Using a tripartite model, contextual, structural, and behavioral factors influencing tax evasion were identified through interviews with legal experts, tax professionals, and economic activists. Results reveal the electronic system’s potential as a policymaking tool by facilitating an information intersection between attorneys and clients, curbing tax evasion. The system fosters financial transparency, reduces tax evasion, and provides a model for other legal and tax sectors through Interdepartmental cooperation. Beyond addressing evasion patterns and devising solutions, it strengthens economic integrity and decreases dependence on oil revenues.

Keywords

References

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Iranian Journal of Public Policy
Volume 11, Issue 3
September 2025
Pages 119-135

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